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Actor-network theory (ANT) has attracted considerable attention in the social sciences in recent 
years and influenced many empirical researchers, particularly in the fields of science and technology 
studies and more recently in social studies of finance. Although it is neither a research method nor a 
methodology, like other broadly philosophical approaches to the social sciences it does have 
implications for how we should approach social research. This entry briefly outlines some of the key 
features of actor-network theory and the orientation to research that it encourages, but its primary 
focus is to provide an evaluation of ANT. ANT has both strengths and weaknesses, and both have 
instructive implications for social research methods.  
Key concepts 
Any brief attempt to summarise a research tradition is likely to miss important features of it and the 
variation between different versions of the tradition. This is perhaps particularly true of actor-
network theory, which actively encourages views of itself as complex, changing, and multiple. Its 
leading advocate Bruno Latour, for example, has famously questioned every element of the name 
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‘actor-network theory’ which he himself introduced (Latour, 1999a). Anne-Marie Mol has argued 
that the world we study is multiple: “that different practices tend to produce not only different 
perspectives but also different realities” (Law, 2004, p. 13) and one implication is that ANT itself 
could be seen as multiple. Indeed one critic has suggested that advocates of ANT switch between 
different readings of it to evade criticism (Kanger, 2017). 
Nevertheless there are elements that seem to be well established within the tradition. Perhaps the 
most fundamental is the claim that our world is composed of assemblages (also known as actants, 
actors, actor-networks, and articulations, to list only the ‘a’s). While the concept itself comes from 
Deleuze, the version advocated in ANT is distinctive – or at least, it seems to have narrowed down 
the range of meanings found in Deleuze. As in Deleuze, the word (derived from the French 
agencement) refers to something that falls somewhere between a thing and a process, with 
elements of both.  For actor-network theorists, assemblages are open, transient, unique networks of 
influences or associations: “an actor-network [= an assemblage] is what is made to act by a large 
star-shaped web of mediators flowing in and out of it. It is made to exist by its many ties: 
attachments are first, actors are second” (Latour, 2005, p. 217). Or as John Law puts it, “assemblage 
is a process of bundling, of assembling, or better of recursive self-assembling in which the elements 
put together are not fixed in shape, do not belong to a larger pre-given list but are constructed at 
least in part as they are entangled together” (Law, 2004, p. 42). Although Latour in particular tends 
to avoid terms like causality, his talk of how things are “made to act” is a clear indicator that ANT is 
oriented to providing something like causal explanations of how events happen. 
It is tempting to think of assemblages as corresponding to our everyday concept of objects or things 
(and in some readings of Deleuze they do), but this would misrepresent Latour’s ontology. One 
distinction which might help to clarify the difference is that assemblages are not bounded in the 
simple spatial way that ordinary things are. An assemblage is not a thing, but a coming together of 
influences. The point is illustrated in Latour’s discussion of the work of the French scientist Louis 
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Pasteur on the process of fermentation, which Pasteur attributed to the influence of yeasts. Pasteur, 
Latour tells us, “encountered a vague, cloudy, grey substance sitting meekly in the corner of his 
flasks and turned it into the splendid, well-defined, articulate yeast twirling magnificently across the 
ballroom of the Academy” (Latour, 1999b, p. 145). “Yeast”, in this sentence, is not simply another 
name for the same “vague, cloudy, grey substance” that had always existed; rather, it is a different 
assemblage, in which Pasteur’s own theories are among the elements or mediators that are bundled 
with or attached to the grey substance. Latour calls this articulation – yeast is an articulation of some 
material stuff and the ideas produced by science that relate to that stuff (and indeed other elements 
too, including perhaps the equipment required to support those ideas and the publications in which 
they are asserted) (Elder-Vass, 2015, pp. 104–8). A sample of yeast, then, is not a simple material 
object with the spatial boundaries that implies, but a conflation of reference and referent, of the 
object with many related influences which ordinary realists would regard as external to the yeast. 
The case also illustrates another central element of actor-network theory: its refusal of various 
closely connected binaries that Latour associates with the modern humanities and social sciences in 
general, including the binary divides that he claims previous thinkers assume between society and 
nature, human and non-human, and subject and object (Latour, 1993). Latour’s notion of yeast, for 
example, no longer locates it unambiguously in the categories of natural, non-human, and object, 
because for him the assemblage we call yeast includes textual, human, and subjective elements. One 
might question whether earlier thinkers are quite as dualistic as Latour suggests, but there is no 
doubt that he takes anti-dualism much further than most of his predecessors. 
Latour has strong views about the implications of this perspective for the research process. 
Research, he argues, must “follow the actors” (Latour, 2005, p. 68), or follow “associations” (Latour, 
Jensen, Venturini, Grauwin, & Boullier, 2012, p. 591) - the connections that make up assemblages. 
But this injunction to follow the actors raises more challenging questions than it solves. For example, 
how is a researcher to identify an actor/assemblage in the first place, when the boundaries of actors 
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are so open and fluid? And do actors exist in forms that the researcher is to discover, or is the extent 
of the network of connections that make up an actor a construction of the researcher? Can 
boundaries ever be drawn between actors? How can we identify the constituent elements of actors 
when those constituents themselves are to be conceived of as assemblages rather than as 
conventional physical objects? How is the researcher to resist the collapse of analysis into a melange 
of vague influences between unbounded networks? 
Although some ANT-influenced researchers engage with some of these concerns, often these 
problems are resolved in a way that subverts the official ontology of assemblages. Without any 
systematic means of delineating assemblages, the elements that are put together to define an 
assemblage are just whatever mix of ordinary observable objects and people that the researcher 
thinks are relevant to the problem at hand – people, flasks, grey substances, and recording devices 
for example – rather than assemblages as Latour defines them. The assemblage concept is then 
rolled out whenever this crude empiricism needs to be clothed with some philosophical 
respectability. In such cases ANT functions not as a solution to any of the classic issues raised by 
empirical social research but as a means of evading them.  
Strengths 
Still, one must judge a tradition by its most consistent applications, so let us turn to the strengths 
and weaknesses of ANT in its Sunday best. ANT has several major strengths, particularly by 
comparison with some well-established approaches to social research.  
First, the injunction to follow the actors produces careful attention to the multiple interacting 
factors that produce any given event. Like many post-positivist approaches to social research, it 
tends to dismiss talk of causes, and yet as we have seen it does produce something like causal 
explanations. This apparent contradiction can be explained: the kind of causal explanation that ANT 
(like poststructuralism) dismisses is the variety espoused by positivists, in which cause is reduced to 
a statistical relationship between quantitative variables. Rather than dispute this interpretation of 
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cause, these traditions tend to give up the term altogether, but it may be more productive, and 
more in tune with lay understandings of the concept, to insist on a different interpretation. If we 
take causes to be factors that interact to produce an outcome, regardless of whether any statistical 
regularity can be observed, then what ANT advocates is a kind of causal analysis that allows us to 
trace causes of individual events and the often complex relations between them. This is certainly an 
improvement on the positivist approach. 
Second, inspired by Latour’s implacable hostility to dualism, ANT encourages us to consider material 
objects and not just human, social, or cultural factors as contributory causes of social events. While 
it is a gross exaggeration to suggest (as Latour does) that all earlier approaches to social science 
ignored the influence of material objects, it is true that there have often been tendencies to neglect 
them and some methodological traditions have gone further. Methodologically radical advocates of 
hermeneutic interpretivism, of social constructionism, and of poststructuralism have argued that the 
social sciences should be concerned exclusively with human meanings and the social or cultural 
forces that shape them, to the exclusion of material factors. Yet it is hard to see how we could make 
sense of, let alone explain, science, technology, digital culture, the economy, healthcare, and myriad 
other social phenomena while ignoring the causal contributions of material objects. ANT has played 
a leading role in reinstating the material in social research and should be applauded for this. 
Third, Latour encourages researchers to look deeper into influences that are attributed to larger 
social powers. He argues that “The idea of a society has become in the hands of later-day ‘social 
explainers’ like a big container ship which no inspector is permitted to board and which allows social 
scientists to smuggle goods across national borders without having to submit to public inspection” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 68). Latour demands that these containers are opened up and their contents 
explicitly examined – that we challenge social concepts used as taken for granted explanations and 
identify the processes and interactions that produce what we think of as social influences. Shortly I 
shall question the way in which Latour uses this argument to deny the existence of social structural 
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forces, but it remains true that advocates of social structural explanation have sometimes been 
guilty of taking concepts like structure and power for granted. ANT is right to demand that defenders 
of structural explanation should show how these structural forces come about.  
There are, then, methodological benefits of ANT’s approach, but I argue that it is possible to achieve 
the same benefits without ANT’s accompanying disadvantages, to which we now turn. 
Weaknesses 
As we have seen, Latour is firmly opposed to dualisms of the natural on one side and the 
social/human/cultural on the other. While this has the benefit of encouraging social researchers to 
consider the causal contributions of material objects, ANT’s response is carried beyond this. In 
rejecting dualisms, ANT also rejects weaker and more reasonable versions of the related distinctions. 
It is not dualist, for example, to think of human beings as different from other kinds of things. This 
does not entail claiming a special metaphysical status for human beings, because we can equally 
validly make the equivalent point for other kinds of things: yeasts, for example, are different from 
other kinds of things, but saying so does not commit us to a metaphysical dualism of yeast vs. non-
yeast. Yet ANT insists on treating other kinds of things as if they had the same properties as human 
beings (it is significant, for example, that they often call assemblages actors when traditionally only 
humans are thought to have the capacity to act). This leads to two problems.  
First, actor-network writers persistently talk about nonhuman things in terms that would only make 
sense if they actually were human (Elder-Vass, 2008, pp. 468–9). Michel Callon talks about 
researchers negotiating with scallops (Callon, 1986, pp. 211, 215). Bruno Latour, discussing a 
prototype transport system, says “The same sort of involvement that has to be solicited from 
[various organisations] now has to be solicited from motors, activators, doors, cabins, software, and 
sensors. They, too, have their conditions; they allow or forbid other alliances” (Latour, 1996, p. 57). 
But scallops do not negotiate, and train doors do not allow or forbid: they are incapable of doing so. 
This is another variety of empiricism – from a purely observational (or behaviourist) point of view 
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the behaviour of the scallops does not meet the expectations of the scientists, just like the 
behaviour of a human who refuses to negotiate. But human beings are a different kind of things 
than scallops, with different capabilities arising from their different structures and histories, and no-
one who recognises this could talk of scallops negotiating.  
Second, this denial of the distinction between human and non-human actors not only misrepresents 
the causal capacities of non-human objects, it also effaces the significance of the capacities of 
human beings. Human beings interpret the world, they communicate using language, they evaluate 
and judge, they reflect on their circumstances, they make decisions. Like the capacities of social 
structures, these human capacities need to be explained, but explaining them does not explain them 
away. And the consequence is that human beings can influence the world in ways that non-human 
objects cannot (though other animals and computerised robots can approximate to some of them). 
But Latour largely ignores these capacities and, ironically, the contribution that the material parts of 
human beings make to providing them. Instead, he prefers to place the contributors to action 
outside the actors, rather than examining how the actors themselves could ever come to act: “An 
‘actor’ . . . is not the source of an action but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming 
toward it” (Latour, 2005, p. 46) (also see Elder-Vass, 2008, p. 470). Actor-network theory, in other 
words, fails to take human agency seriously and ignores both the issues that it raises and the 
resources it offers – crucial resources for the social sciences – for explaining some of the factors that 
contribute to bringing about social events. 
This failure to take the particular properties of human actors seriously contributes to a third, equally 
consequential, failure: the rejection or radical neglect of the role of social structures in causing social 
events. Despite occasional qualifications, Latour consistently argues that researchers should replace 
accounts that cite social structures as causes with accounts that trace the connections between 
individual actors (human or otherwise). He wants us to dismantle the social, so that “the study of 
society therefore moves from the study of the social as this is usually conceived, to a study of 
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methods of association” (Latour, 1986, p. 264). In the sociology that results “there is no society, no 
social realm, and no social ties” (Latour, 2005, pp. 108–9). So states, cultures, organisations, 
inequality, patriarchy and the like all disappear from view, never to be allowed an official return. 
Earlier I praised Latour’s insistence that we examine what lies behind the social. However, for Latour 
this is a rhetorical move that paves the way for dispensing with the social altogether, whereas it 
would be more productive as an explanatory move that helps us to explain how the social works. 
The explanatory strategy leads to the conclusion that social structures are different from other kinds 
of causal structures because they depend on the intentional properties of human beings – our 
abilities to represent, think, and communicate, for example. This is the sense in which Latour’s denial 
of the distinctive properties of human beings contributes to his failure to recognise the distinctive 
properties of social structures: structures that depend on how people think (though also, of course, 
on other factors including the contributions of material objects). Refusal to recognise these 
distinctions leaves us incapable of explaining enormously important social forces – incapable both of 
explaining how they come about and of explaining how they impact upon the world. This is not only 
profoundly unsatisfactory from an explanatory point of view, but also profoundly reactionary, 
denying the need for critique of social structures by denying their causal significance entirely. 
ANT’s repudiation of structure and agency is by no means its only weakness. Indeed these moves 
reflect another, more fundamental, problem. For Latour and his fellow actor-network theorists, 
assemblages are not only vaguely bounded and transient but also unique. No two assemblages are 
the same, or even similar enough to fall into causal types: classes of object that have similar causal 
capacities (Elder-Vass, 2015). This denial of causal types is part of what lies behind ANT’s denial of 
human distinctiveness: if there are no causal types then there is no basis on which to say that 
humans are similar to each other in some respect that marks them off from other kinds of things.  
But the denial of causal types also has worrying methodological consequences. If there are no causal 
types, then we can never use our knowledge of how other members of a type behave to help us 
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explain the causal contributions of objects to events. Consider, for example, a case discussed by 
Latour, in which scientists conclude that earthworms are helping to extend the reach of a tropical 
forest by ingesting fertile soil from the forest zone and then excreting it in the sandy area beyond 
the forest edge, thus creating conditions in which the forest flora can grow (Latour, 1999b, pp. 74–
6). Scientists can observe the behaviour of individual earthworms, and analyse the content of 
individual soil samples, but they can conclude nothing about the larger-scale process unless they can 
generalise their conclusions to a much larger population of unobserved earthworms on the grounds 
that they are all of a similar type and therefore can be expected to behave in a similar way in similar 
circumstances. Or consider a classical sociological case: when I observe a friend raising her hand and 
gesturing in a certain way, I can conclude that she is greeting me, but only because I know that when 
people who share certain cultural knowledge gesture in this way they mean to wave, and mean that 
waving to function as a greeting. I do not need to examine the neural pathways that formed in my 
friend’s head, or cross examine her about her intentions when she made that gesture, because I can 
assume that she is an instance of a causal type: people with certain cultural beliefs about waving. 
Without the assumption that objects fall into causal types almost all explanatory and interpretive 
work is impossible, and of course actor-network researchers themselves implicitly rely on this 
assumption in their own work, in flagrant contradiction of the official ontology. 
Improving on ANT 
How is one to respond to a research tradition that mixes significant advantages with highly 
problematic flaws? If the flaws can be resolved within the fundamental framework of the research 
tradition, one might work within it and seek to change it. But the flaws of actor-network theory flow 
from its central ontological commitments, and in particular the version of assemblage theory around 
which it is constructed. In these circumstances it makes more sense to embrace a different tradition 
that can provide (or be flexed to provide) those advantages without the flaws.  
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Thus, we need a tradition that recognises the interacting causal contributions to social events made 
not only by material objects and people, but also by social structures. We need a tradition that 
recognises the distinctiveness of the causal capacities of human individuals and the roles that culture 
and social structure can play as a result of those distinctive capacities. We need a tradition that 
recognises that every event is brought about by a unique configuration of causal forces but also that 
many things fall into causal types and that this is what makes it possible for us to analyse causal 
forces in the first place. I suggest that such a tradition is already available, in the shape of various 
strands of post-positivist sociological realism, although there is certainly also scope for that tradition 
to learn from the strengths of actor-network theory. 
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